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Child protection professionals work in a multidisciplinary system in which the law and the family court play central roles and
which collects an increasing amount of data. Yet we know little about what impact the law has on whether a child is removed
by child protective services, is deemed neglected by a family court, or reuniﬁes with a parent. Do state-to-state variations in
child protection laws, or changes by individual states to their laws, lead to diﬀerent outcomes for children and families? The
dramatic variations in child welfare practice from one state to another suggest that legal variations do matter. Yet empirical
research on these questions is scarce both because we collect too little data to measure all such issues, and, because we have
failed to study the data we do have. This article is a plea for researchers to rectify that problem and for policymakers to
improve data collection. Doing so would facilitate a more clear understanding of the law’s eﬀect on child protection outcomes
and aid policymakers and advocates in identifying both promising and problematic practices and legal reforms.
Key Points for the Family Court Community:
 Signiﬁcant legal variations exist between states and may help explain diﬀerent outcomes in diﬀerent state child protection systems.
 The child protection ﬁeld now collects large amounts of data, but little data focused on legal procedures or substantive
legal diﬀerences from state to state. As a result, the ﬁeld knows relatively little about how legal variables aﬀect
outcomes.
 A better understanding of the impact on legal variables will help answer important policy, advocacy, and academic
questions about child protection law and family courts.
 This article argues for reforms to data collection policies to enable further study of legal variables and for researchers
to make greater use of existing data.
Keywords: Child Protection System; Child Welfare; Empirical/Statistical Data; Family Court; and State Law & Policy.

I. INTRODUCTION
Child protection professionals work in a multidisciplinary system in which the law and the family
court play central roles. Yet we know little about what impact the law has on whether a child is
removed by child protective services, is adjudicated neglected by a family court, or is reuniﬁed with
a parent. Do state-to-state variations in child protection laws or changes by individual states to their
laws lead to diﬀerent outcomes for children and families? Empirical research on this questions is
scarce. This scarcity is both because we collect too little data to measure all such issues, and, because
we have failed to study the data we do have. This article is a plea for researchers to rectify that problem and for policymakers to improve data collection policies to help research the law’s eﬀect on child
protection outcomes.
We live in an era of big data, and child protection is no exception. We are awash in local, state,
and federally reported data, and we work in a multidisciplinary ﬁeld in which empirical studies are
now common and have undoubtedly advanced our ﬁeld. We have a much better understanding today
than, say, twenty years ago of what factors place children most at risk, how such factors correlate
with family court decisions, how removal from families and placement in foster care can aﬀect children (positively and negatively), and what programs are eﬀective at preventing or treating child
maltreatment.
Yet we are not much closer than we were decades ago to understanding how legal variations aﬀect
what happens in child protection cases. The most widely available data does not include important
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legal steps—like what court hearings are held and what decisions courts make—and nearly all studies decline to test the eﬀect of legal variables on case outcomes. These data gaps are especially problematic because they undermine the ability of research to impact policy. If research does not engage
with the “real-life social work with children and families” then it will be diﬃcult to translate research
to practice.1 “Real-life” child protection practice involves the law and legal systems and so is an
essential topic for study.
Enormous outcome diﬀerences exist between jurisdictions at every stage of child protection cases.
These diﬀerences are so large that varying state laws, administrative agencies, and family courts,
rather than demographic or socioeconomic diﬀerences, likely explain most of the diﬀerences. For
instance, Missouri authorities deemed 1.3 out of every 1,000 children to be abuse or neglect victims
in 2013; the ﬁgure was 7.5 times higher in neighboring Illinois, 12 times higher in neighboring Iowa,
and 15 times higher in neighboring Kentucky.2 The percent of children labeled victims whose cases
were brought to court by state agencies ranged from 2.2 percent in Mississippi to 61.6 percent in
New Hampshire.3 The percent of children labeled victims who state agencies removed from their
families and placed in foster care ranged from 5.5 percent in Illinois to 91.5 percent in Florida.4 The
median time between a termination of parental rights and adoption ﬁnalization ranges from under
one month in Rhode Island to 14.1 months in Illinois.5 New York’s and Florida’s child populations
are nearly identical,6 but there were ﬁfty percent more adoptions from foster care in Florida,7 and
sixty-eight percent more children listed as “waiting” for an adoption in New York.8
This article is a call for empirical research to address these and other diﬀerences and evaluate
whether and to what extent legal diﬀerences between states cause diﬀerent outcomes—and therefore
what legal reform eﬀorts might be expected to have the most signiﬁcant impact. It is also a call for
reform of the existing child protection data reporting rules to include key legal data points—a reform
which would facilitate study of the law as an independent variable.

II. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF LEGAL VARIABLES WOULD BE
VALUABLE AND WORTH THE COST
The importance of studying the eﬀect of the law and legal systems on what happens to children
and families in child protection cases is straightforward: Child protection is a multidisciplinary ﬁeld,
in which the law and legal systems play prominent roles, and in which those roles are presumed to
matter signiﬁcantly. To handle individual cases, we spend billions of dollars operating family court
systems, paying lawyers, and documenting decisions. To set policy, we litigate disputed legal issues
and advocate to state legislatures, Congress, and multiple agencies for desired legal reforms. Understanding what impact child protection laws have and understanding how diﬀerent legal reforms could
aﬀect what happens to children and families, should be an important goal for everyone involved in
the system. Greater empirical knowledge would provide direct beneﬁts to policy makers and advocates regarding which laws are optimal and what policies are worth advocating for. Where there is
no consensus as to the optimal result, greater empirical knowledge can still assist by focusing debates
on laws that have the greatest impact.
Other areas may also be understudied, but child protection law and legal systems are particularly
important to research because courts make the most important decisions—whether a child can be
removed, whether s/he will reunify, and, if not, what family s/he will live with and what legal status
will deﬁne that family. Moreover, our child protection law and legal system are designed to balance
the fundamental constitutional rights of parents and children to family integrity with the importance
of protecting children from parental abuse and neglect; empirical research should help us understand
the balance that diﬀerent policy choices have struck and thus inform further discussions about
whether and how to ﬁne tune, or more dramatically reform, that balance.
Putting this argument into practice would impose some challenges. Data reporting systems are
expensive to change and to operate, and new data reporting requirements impose a burden on child
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protection agencies.9 This section will outline the argument why studying the law’s eﬀect on child
protection case outcomes is important enough to warrant those costs.

A. STRONGER DATA CAN INFORM SMARTER POLICY CHOICES

The ﬁrst, and most obvious, reason for studying the law’s impact on case outcomes is to enable
better-informed policy choices. Determining which laws make a diﬀerence and how they make a difference provides essential knowledge for more informed policy choices by Congress, state legislatures, state and federal agencies, family and appellate courts, and advocates of all stripes.
Some empirical studies could lead directly to policy reforms and conﬁrm or reject the importance
of current practices. Research into the eﬀectiveness of subsidized guardianship, for example, led to
its expansion nationwide and the provision of federally-supported guardianship subsidies.10 Research
into other legal variables could similarly lead to reforms. If, for example, studies of the frequency of
review and permanency hearings found that somewhat more frequent hearings—say, every four
months—correlated to a statistically signiﬁcant degree with faster and longer-lasting permanency
outcomes (i.e., faster reuniﬁcations, adoptions, and guardianships, with fewer foster care reentries)—
and if even more frequent hearings lacked such a correlation, that would provide strong reason for
states to follow such a timeline and for the federal government to provide funding to support it. But,
if research showed minimal eﬀects from court timelines, that result should trigger reconsideration of
the long-standing push for more frequent hearings.
Empirical studies can also sharpen existing policy debates even when they cannot resolve them.
Research into the standard of proof at trial—which is a preponderance of the evidence in most states
but clear and convincing evidence in 18 states11—illustrates the point. Recognizing that no legal system will reach perfect decisions, standards of proof serve to skew error—a high standard of proof
skews error in favor of family integrity and against coercive state intervention, while a lower standard of proof does the inverse. A value judgment about these particular risks is necessary to determine
which standard is best. No empirical study can provide that value judgment. But an empirical study
into what eﬀect diﬀerent standards actually have provides an important baseline for discussing that
values question.

B. UNDERSTANDING THE LAW’S ROLE IN A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SYSTEM

Studying the eﬀect of child protection law and legal systems on outcomes could decode which of
several overlapping systems has the most impact on outcomes and thus where to best direct reform
eﬀorts. In particular, it could reveal whether child protection agencies or family courts have more
impact on what happens to children and families. A judge formally makes the most important decisions in a child protection case—whether a child will remain at home or live in foster care, whether a
parent has abused or neglected a child, whether a child will reunify with a parent, or live with a
guardian or adoptive parent. Surveys of child protection agency caseworkers conclude that they
“perceive juvenile court personnel as having inﬂuence on the way that they carry out their
practices,”12 suggesting that agencies may decide on positions in cases based on what they expect
courts would be willing to support. On the other hand, there is no doubt that agencies have signiﬁcant
power over children and families in child protection cases—in particular, they generally decide when
to remove children from their families and when to ﬁle abuse or neglect petitions. Once a child is in
foster care, foster care agencies “bear far greater responsibility for the day-to-day management of
cases than does the court,”13 and the agency’s position may carry especially strong weight with the
court.
But how much do the law and the court system impact the judge’s decision, especially compared
with agencies? Consider a permanency hearing in a simpliﬁed composite case:
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The child protection agency removed Davon, age 8, from his mother 14 months ago based on evidence of
his mother’s heroin addiction, and placed him with his maternal grandmother. Davon’s mother has completed one stint in inpatient drug treatment, then relapsed, then entered and successfully completed
another and has tested clean for six weeks. The agency caseworker believes the likelihood that she will
relapse again is unacceptably high, and that she has not fulﬁlled her case plan because she has not
obtained long-term housing, remains unemployed, and only recently began mental health treatment. The
case worker believes adoption is in Davon’s best interest. Davon’s grandmother would be willing to raise
Davon permanently but opposes terminating Davon’s mother’s parental rights.

At the permanency hearing, the judge will decide whether Davon will reunify with his mother
and, if not, whether the permanency plan will remain reuniﬁcation or shift to adoption—initiating
termination of parental rights litigation—or guardianship. Nonlegal factors will shape these decisions, especially Davon’s age, his mother’s poverty, and substance abuse history and treatment. The
services that Davon and his mother have received—including any service providers’ opinions—
may be presented to the judge. The case worker will present the agency’s views, which are likely
shaped by the agency’s regulations, policies (formal and informal), supervision structure, and culture, in addition to the case worker’s own judgment. The legal system will ﬁlter all of these facts
and perspectives through laws governing the provision of counsel to all parties, setting timelines for
court hearings, establishing standards for reuniﬁcation or judging case plan compliance, and providing permanency options (or not) beyond reuniﬁcation and adoption. Studying state-by-state legal
variations will help untangle what eﬀect the law has, especially in comparison to other factors, in
cases like this.
More detailed study of the impact—if any—of legal variables could also lead to a clearer debate
of how child protection law ought to balance power between courts and agencies. It is possible that
the agency’s view on Davon’s case is more likely to impact the result, regardless of what state law
says. If the law enacted by legislators and adjudicated by judges is of little moment, then that requires
policy makers to determine if it is proper to delegate so much power to agencies—and if not, what
speciﬁc checks and balances would be most appropriate.
C. UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATING THE RULE OF LAW IN FAMILY COURT

Empirical studies can provide important information about the rule of law in child protection
cases. This is no small issue, as family courts have long been known for their procedural informality
and vague legal standards and thus criticized for not following the rule of law or, as an old case put
it, for applying “pure shuttlecock law . . . for whimsical application to child custody controversies.”14
More modern critiques have argued that family courts feature an insular group of repeat players—
family court judges, lawyers, and case workers who practice regularly in family court—who are susceptible to group think15 and make decisions based on heuristics (cognitive short cuts) that block
evaluation of the most important factors in a case.16 As a result, they use coercive authority in a therapeutic guise to pressure professionals and parties to acquiesce to state-created plans to break up families pending parental rehabilitation.17
These criticisms suggest a cynicism that the law on the books actually matters to what happens in
child protection cases and a belief that this insular group of professionals will do what it wishes
regardless of legal variations or changes. (Cynics might further argue that the scarcity of studies of
the law’s eﬀect reﬂects an understanding throughout the ﬁeld that the law does not matter.) Either
conﬁrming or disproving that cynicism could provide important knowledge to policy makers and
advocates. The ﬁeld would beneﬁt from more comprehensive studies about whether the law really
shapes judicial decisions and the actions that agencies and other parties take before coming to court.
If not, it would support critics of family court culture—and perhaps support arguments that family
courts must reform so that law matters more. If the law matters greatly, then those critiques would
require, at a minimum, some reﬁnement.
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III. CHILD PROTECTION LAW SHOULD BE RIPE
FOR EMPIRICAL STUDY
Child protection law provides a promising ﬁeld for empirical study because diﬀerent state laws
create easy comparison groups. All states follow the same legal architecture in child maltreatment
cases to comply with Supreme Court decisions and federal child protection funding statutes. But
important legal variables exist across the familiar legal architecture of child protection investigations,
court petitions, adjudications, dispositions, and permanency hearings. With colleagues, I have studied one of these variables in a recent article—the standard of proof applied to state allegations of
abuse and neglect at trial.18 Scores more variables exist and those variables should be ripe for study.
Scholars would have to control for demographic and other diﬀerences from one state to another and
study the eﬀect of the legal diﬀerences between states. States also change some of their laws, making
it possible for scholars to perform before and after studies to determine what impact such changes
had, if they can control for other variables within such states.
This section discusses a nonexhaustive set of legal variables that should be ripe for empirical
study. All of the examples provided identify legal areas regarding which researchers can catalog state
laws and policies, and compare outcomes in states that have made diﬀerent policy choices.

A. CASE PROCESSING TIMELINES

Child protection law has long sought to make decisions along a child’s sense of time—that is,
quickly. States now mandate adjudications within relatively short time periods19 and federal funding
statutes require agencies to develop case plans within 60 days of removing a child.20 When reuniﬁcation does not occur quickly, federal law requires that state courts hold permanency hearings within
twelve months of the child’s entry into foster care and at least every twelve months after that.21 Federal legislation has shortened these timelines. For instance, the Adoption and Safe Families Act shortened the time for holding permanency hearings from 18 months to 12 months,22 because Congress
concluded “that 18 months is a very long time in the life of a young child.”23
These federal requirements impose minimum standards for state child protection systems; some
states go beyond those minimums and have codiﬁed more stringent requirements. Some require
agencies to complete case plans within the same sixty-day timeline that federal law requires,24
while others impose a variety of shorter timelines.25 Some states require permanency hearings after
twelve months of foster care and every twelve months thereafter,26 while others require review
hearings within the ﬁrst year of foster care and more frequent permanency hearings after that ﬁrst
year.27
This legislative landscape raises several questions. Do more frequent hearings help achieve permanency faster? If so, is there an ideal hearing timeline? Is providing more frequent hearings a costeﬀective use of resources? The existing empirical record suggests that more frequent hearings might
help, but the record is far from deﬁnitive—in large part because no study has compared states with
the federal minimum timelines to states which require more frequent hearings. One study conﬁrms,
unsurprisingly, that counties with more judicial personnel per case are able to meet statutory hearing
timelines better than less well-resourced counties in the same state.28 However, the impact of more
frequent hearings on actual outcomes is less clear; the higher resourced counties had shorter timelines
to adoptions, but no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the number of cases with a permanent placement of any
kind (including reuniﬁcation) within 15 months.29 It is unclear whether the faster adoptions resulted
from more frequent hearings or some other diﬀerence between the higher and lower-resourced counties. We do not know if courts would comply with requirements for more frequent hearings and, if
they would, if these earlier ﬁndings would be replicated across the country or if more frequent hearings could be shown to improve reuniﬁcation timelines generally or to speed adoption or guardianship only or some more complicated relationship.
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B. PROVISION AND ROLE OF COUNSEL

Child protection law has seen many developments in the provision and role of counsel for both
children and parents. As with any appointed counsel system, jurisdictions vary in the fees, caseloads,
and other indicators of quality of appointed counsel for both children and parents. State laws also
vary in whether they appoint lawyers to represent children’s stated wishes or what attorneys believe
to be in children’s best interests; Jean Koh Peters placed the 50 states and the District of Columbia
into six separate categories based on their diﬀerent statutes regarding representing children.30 Certain
states have changed their standards—for instance, New York moved from a best interests to stated
interests model in 200731—thus permitting before and after comparisons. A recent review found
only a small number of studies on the impact of children’s legal representation and concluded that
prior studies’ designs were “seriously ﬂawed.”32 This should be no surprise because, as that review
pointed out, there is “little or no empirical data on the question of what makes a good lawyer” of any
kind.33 But unlike other areas of law, the representation of children varies signiﬁcantly by state
depending on the statutorily mandated role of such representatives, thus lending itself to interstate
comparisons.
States also vary in their provision of counsel for parents; most provide counsel to parents throughout a case but several make appointment of counsel discretionary or do not provide counsel in all
cases—avoiding provision of counsel in between an initial disposition and a permanency trial such
as a termination of parental rights.34 State court litigation has addressed some of these issues in certain states, addressing for instance, the constitutionality of denying parents counsel for the ﬁrst year
or more of case until the state chooses to seek a termination of parental rights.35
Comparing diﬀerent jurisdictions could test the hypothesis that stronger parent representation and
stated interest children’s representation would lead to results more consistent with parents’ and children’s wishes—presumably,36 fewer adjudications and faster reuniﬁcations. Some intrajurisdictional
research has suggested that strong parent representation can also speed all permanency outcomes and
shorten stays in foster care.37 These studies focus on individual programs located in one jurisdiction.
Comparing strong right to counsel states—states with strong statutory or case law right to counsel
for parents and children, coupled with strong organizations employing lawyers with reasonable caseloads and good training—with weak ones could yield important results and come closer to satisfying
the “serious need for rigorous social science research on representation of children [and] representation of parents.”38
C. SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS FOR MALTREATMENT, REUNIFICATION,
AND TERMINATION

States vary in the substantive standards they apply in abuse and neglect cases, as scholars have
long noted.39 Three standards at various stages of a case illustrate the signiﬁcant variation between
states. First, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have, by statute or court decision,
deﬁned any prenatal exposure to an illegal drug as per se neglect; the remainder do not.40 Second,
most states do not specify when parents and children are entitled to reunify, but a few states do.
South Carolina has a particularly reuniﬁcation-friendly statute, placing a burden on the child protection agency to establish “compelling reasons” for selecting any permanency plan other than reuniﬁcation and requiring courts to order reuniﬁcation when parents have “remedied the conditions that
caused the removal” absent “unreasonable risk[s] of harm.”41 Third, states vary in both the number
and type of statutory criteria that can support a termination of parental rights.42
These diﬀerences raise questions that should be studied empirically: Does a statute declaring prenatal drug exposure to be per se neglect lead agencies to remove more infants or ﬁle more cases in
such situations, or only change how states petition cases?43 Do diﬀerent standards regarding reuniﬁcation aﬀect the frequency of that permanency option, agencies’ recommendations to courts about
whether or when to change to a plan other than reuniﬁcation, or the speed with which reuniﬁcation is
reached? Do diﬀerent termination of parental rights statutes aﬀect whether or when states seek
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terminations, or the frequency with which courts grant them? Existing studies do not address these
questions.
D. PERMANENCY OPTIONS

When reuniﬁcation is not an option, states vary in what permanency options are available and
what ﬁnancial subsidies will support them. Thirty-seven states oﬀer subsidized kinship guardianship
and some of those also oﬀer subsidized nonkinship guardianship.44 States vary in their subsidy policies as well—some oﬀer adoption and guardianship subsidies which extend until age 21, and some
do not.45 Researchers have also observed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between states when it comes to permanency outcomes and the need for a “[b]etter understanding of the reasons for these diﬀerences
between jurisdictions.”46
Intrastate research has found that oﬀering subsidized guardianship increases the total number of
children who leave foster care to permanent homes and changes the balance between permanency
options as some families previously pushed to adoption choose guardianship instead.47 However, a
2008 federal law expanding funding for subsidized guardianship has not lead to either result nationally.48 Comparisons between states with diﬀerent sets of permanency options and within states that
have changed their permanency policies could provide useful insights and perhaps help explain the
failure of the 2008 federal law to catalyze national change. Does the power of agencies—some of
which continue to oﬀer guardianship relatively rarely, even in states that have subsidized guardianship statutes or policies49—outweigh legal or policy changes? Or do such changes have some
impacts, even in the face of some agency resistance?
E. QUESTIONS ABOUT CHILD PROTECTION AGENCY STRUCTURE AND POWER

Child protection agencies are crucial actors in any child protection case. But these agencies, and
their authorities, are not uniform, and state variations exist both in their structure and in their authority compared with family courts. Some states operate statewide systems while others divide child
protection agency authority up among county agencies; in the former group, state agencies appoint
and supervise local staﬀ, while in the latter group, local elected oﬃcials have that authority.50 Funding responsibilities between state and county governments can also vary.51 Empirical studies could
address whether these structural legal diﬀerences aﬀect the most important outcome measures, such
as child safety and permanency outcomes.52
States also vary in the precise balance of power between child protection agencies and juvenile
courts, as commentators have long noted.53 For instance, do juvenile courts have the power to modify agencies’ case plans, or to order agencies to place children in speciﬁc homes or to provide particular services, or are those powers reserved to the child protection agency only?54 This legal variable
raises questions about institutional competencies of courts, Canada and agencies and United Kingdom value of agency deference. But it also raises empirical questions—does court or agency authority enhance placement stability, or permanency or well-being outcomes? That question requires a
complex study of results in diﬀerent jurisdictions, Canada with diﬀerent rules.
F. POLICIES FOR PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION

Public concern about the likely overmedication of foster children has increased over the past decade, leading Congress to require states to develop policies for oversight of foster children’s mental
health care through legislation enacted in 2008 and strengthened in 2011.55 Before such legislation,
states varied widely in both the frequency of foster children’s use of psychotropic medication (ranging from 6.4% to 72.0% of foster children) and in the frequency of multiple psychotropic medications (which ranged from 0.5% to 13.6% of foster children).56 Subsequent research has catalogued
the wide variety of state policies which resulted. Some involved preauthorization monitoring while
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others featured “red ﬂag” policies to identify possible overmedication after it has occurred.57 Most
policies have not involved formal agency rulemaking.58
We do not know, however, what impact—if any—these new policies are having. We do not know
if pre-2008 policy diﬀerences, or post-2008 policy changes correlate with psychotropic medication
use rates. In the absence of such data it is not surprising that states develop policies in a vacuum:
“[T]here is little evidence that these approaches are being implemented or studied in a systemic way
to identify which approaches improve well-being for youth in foster care.”59
G. COMBINING MULTIPLE, UNITED KINGDOM MEASURES

A collection of state laws might add up to more than the sum of their parts. For instance, several
of the varying standards discussed here reﬂect more or less protection for parental rights and family
integrity. Legislation that imposes a higher standard of proof, a stronger right to counsel, and fees,
and narrower deﬁnitions of neglect might reﬂect a legislative judgment that such family integrity protections are the best policy, and that judgment might have a cumulative eﬀect stronger than any of
those individual provisions might predict. Empirical research to identify any such cumulative eﬀects
would make important contributions.

IV. CHILD PROTECTION’S BIG DATA AND ITS ABSENCE
OF LEGAL VARIABLES
Child protection is now awash in data. As the recently launched Center for State Child Welfare
Data at the University of Chicago’s Chapin Hall has put it, “[t]he days of saying ‘we just don’t have
the data’ are over.”60 Federal funding statutes require states to report huge amounts of data, and
many state laws require similar data reporting. More specialized data sets also exist. One result is
that the ﬁeld now features much empirical work. At the same time, existing data has only limited
ability to trace children’s and families’ interactions with the legal system and what impact the law or
legal practices might have on their cases. This section will outline available data and its limits and
illustrate the challenges those limits create for the empirical study of the law’s impact.
A. A MASS OF DATA—BUT NOT ABOUT LEGAL DETAILS

A brief summary of two of the leading child welfare data systems illustrates both the promise and
shortcomings of existing data.61 The federal government collects two sets of data from state child
protection agencies—through the AFCARS and the NCANDS. Both have catalyzed the collection of
a wide range of immensely valuable data, but no meaningful collection of data connected to legal
variables.
AFCARS data systems result from a congressional mandate that states report data to the federal
government as a condition of receiving federal funding for foster care systems. Federal regulations
list the data that states must track,62 requiring, for instance, that for every foster child, states track
age, race/ethnicity, disability, date of removal, “conditions associated with child’s removal,” type of
placement and caretaker information, permanency plan, date of, and reason for foster care exit.63 The
Department of Health and Human Services collects diﬀerent child welfare data for NCANDS from
state agencies, and this data provides the basis for many of the most frequently cited federal child
protection publications, such as the annual Child Maltreatment reports.64 NCANDS provides a
wealth of case-speciﬁc detail; the Department of Health and Human Services has a twenty-one-page
list of all the data points included in each child ﬁle.65
It is not diﬃcult to envision the wealth of information one can glean from AFCARS and
NCANDS, and much academic work has relied upon these data. Challenges to such research
remain—such as the diﬃculty in tracking children longitudinally66 and the challenge of incomplete
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or inaccurate data from states67—but these issues have been suﬃciently resolved to permit important
research.68 Researchers at Chapin Hall have compiled much of this data into a multistate foster care
data center, permitting more statistically powerful comparisons between states.69
Legal variables, however, are conspicuously lacking from both AFCARS and NCANDS data
sets. For instance, there is no reporting of the actual statutory forms of abuse or neglect substantiated
by the state during its investigation, alleged by the state in family court, or adjudicated by a court; or
when the child’s case had a hearing in court, whether the court followed the agency’s recommendation, or how much time passed from a permanency hearing to the ﬁling of a permanency action. Federal requirements are striking for omitting any legal variables or court system interactions. AFCARS
regulations require no legal variables. NCANDS similarly lacks legal variables. Only two data points
on its twenty-one-page list of variables relate to the legal system—whether the state ﬁled a petition
in the family court, and, if so, when.70 What the petition alleges, what hearings follow, and what happens at those hearings is not reported. These omissions are particularly odd for data systems designed
for child protection, foster care, and adoption cases, which all require court action to occur, yet no
court data was included. The regulations read as if only the state agency’s actions and not the court
system mattered.

B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS FROM EXISTING DATA

The available data can lead to immensely useful studies. Statistical techniques permit comparisons
between similarly situated children, and thus enable researchers to study key variables.71 Identifying
such data sets regarding matched cases in multiple states would be labor intensive, but possible. But
use of federal data remains diﬃcult. This section illustrates the limitations of using existing national
data sets which make it diﬃcult to test legal variables. This section also notes many researchers’
choice to study state data sets so they can access better information about legal variables, and discusses the limitations of using state data sets.

1. Federal Data Sets

The absence of legal variables from these large data sets makes studying them diﬃcult. These difﬁculties are illustrated by a recent study of the impact of diﬀerent standards of proof on child welfare
case outcomes, of which I am a coauthor. Trial standards of proof vary from state to state; most states
have a preponderance of the evidence standard, but eighteen have clear and convincing.72 The standard of proof is a straightforward and well-understood legal provision, so we should be able to study
its impact (if any) fairly directly. But the available data through AFCARS and NCANDS do not contain enough details to do so—we cannot track the children in each data set from investigation to substantiation to petition ﬁling to adjudication. Those data do not even say whether or not a court
adjudicated a parent abusive or neglectful. It is easy to see that there are a large number of children
removed by state agencies who reunify with their family in a matter of weeks,73 but neither AFCARS
nor NCANDS reports if these quick reuniﬁcations result from state agencies dropping their petitions,
judges dismissing petitions, agencies or judges choosing to reunify children after an adjudication, or
some other phenomenon. The absence of such data makes it diﬃcult to identify the standard of
proof’s impact. The same diﬃculty exists whenever the speciﬁc hearings held and legal actions taken
are relevant, because AFCARS and NCANDS do not track that data.
Due to these limitations, we turned to yet another data set—the NSCAW.74 NSCAW does not
track whether a judge adjudicates a child neglected or dismisses a petition, but does report when
court appearances occur. We used the existence of hearings after the adjudication hearing as a proxy
for the court ruling for the state at adjudication (otherwise it would lack jurisdiction to hold further
hearings).75 But the NSCAW data set only provides statewide data in eight states, signiﬁcantly limiting the sample size.76
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As a result of these data limitations, we were only able to reach some tentative conclusions, and
with less statistical signiﬁcance than we had hoped. If federal data enabled us to use a larger sample
from more states, we would have likely been able to obtain more robust results. This same challenge
would aﬀect the study of some of the variables discussed in Part II. For instance, studying the eﬀect
of diﬀerent case processing timelines from one state to another or the impact of speciﬁc neglect deﬁnitions would be diﬃcult without having data on what hearings were held when or what speciﬁc
forms of neglect are alleged in petitions and adjudicated by courts.
2. State Data Sets

Other scholars have used data from state agencies and courts to analyze child welfare case outcomes.77 These studies review key details reported in state but not national databases. Such studies
have been valuable and they suggest that the legal system impacts case outcomes—and thus support
further study of legal diﬀerences. But these studies have important limitations—they cannot test the
eﬀect of legal diﬀerences between states. For instance, one study sought to determine the eﬀect of
judicial case processing timelines on case outcomes, but did so within only one state.78 The result of
the study is important—faster hearings correlate with faster case closure.79 But the timeline variations resulted from court practices and individual judges’ scheduling, not legal diﬀerences. Further,
by focusing on only one state, the study could not explore whether changing statutory or rule-based
timelines would have a similar eﬀect, or which timelines are most important. Another study comparing regional diﬀerences within a state concludes that juvenile courts impact which cases get ﬁled and
their permanency outcomes. This suggests that the perceived attitudes of judges to particular fact patterns and the timing of court involvement shapes outcomes.80 The study leaves unanswered what
impact, if any, the law had. A third study examined the eﬀect of model parent representation programs by comparing the case outcomes for such programs with similar cases within the same jurisdiction.81 That study found signiﬁcant beneﬁts to model parent representation, but could not
examine whether interstate right to counsel variations had any impact.

V. MANY EMPIRICAL STUDIES, BUT A DEARTH OF EFFORTS
TO STUDY THE DIFFERENCE THAT THE LAW MAKES
The child protection ﬁeld has a wealth of empirical studies into a wide range of topics. It also has
easily-identiﬁable legal variables82 and a wide and growing set of case-speciﬁc data.83 Yet the ﬁeld
lacks signiﬁcant numbers of studies which focus on legal variables and what impact, if any, they
have on outcomes. The proliferation of data has led to immensely valuable studies. But, most studies
do not look at the law as a variable which could impact outcomes.
A recent meta-review of empirical studies of factors correlated with removing children from their
homes and placing them in foster care illustrates the dearth of studies examining the law. The metareview examined studies of 75 data sets. The strong majority of these studies reviewed only one city,
county, or state, precluding comparison of jurisdictions with diﬀerent legal standards deﬁning maltreatment or for substantiating maltreatment or removing children.84 The other studies did not focus
on the law as a possible explanation for removals.85 Studies which do use data sets involving children subject to diﬀerent laws typically study variables other than those laws.86
The dearth of studies is evident in the leading journals focusing on the children protection system,
such as this journal, Children and Youth Services Review, Child Maltreatment, Child Welfare, or the
Journal of Public Child Welfare. Any issue of those journals will likely include high-quality and
important empirical studies. But these studies generally do not use the law as an independent variable
to study legal diﬀerences between states or the impact of a new law within one state. Some studies
note legal variations between states and use multistate data sets but do not explore whether those
legal variations explain diﬀerent practices or outcomes.87 A review of all titles published in the past
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ﬁve years of those ﬁve journals found only four articles88 treating the law as an independent variable.89 Searches for the term “law” and “legal” on Chapin Hall’s Center for State Child Welfare Data
website revealed only one study, which did not address legal variations between states.90
Several studies illustrate the possibility of studying the eﬀect of interstate legal diﬀerences and
how scholars have not yet chosen to study those. For instance, one study surveyed more than 15,000
older foster youth from every state who are tracked by states in the National Youth in Transition
Database and sought to identify variables that predict whether the youth become teen parents.91 The
study did not ask if they lived in a state which extended foster care to age twenty-one or had any
other legal variable that might aﬀect that outcome.92 Another study identiﬁed some variables correlated with the size of racial disparities in the families subject to child protection investigations. The
study tested whether poverty rates, state diversity, and other nonlegal factors aﬀected the results—
not whether diﬀerent standards of proof, neglect deﬁnitions, or other laws might shape the racial
makeup of investigated families.93 These studies would be even more valuable if they, or subsequent
studies, addressed relevant legal variables.
Legal journals focused on children’s issues tend to have few empirical pieces at all, but their legal
focus could possibly lead them to publish more pieces studying the impact of legal variations. But
they do not do so. A review of the past ﬁve years of the U.C. Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy, Family Law Quarterly, the Whittier Journal of Child and Family Advocacy, and the Children’s
Legal Rights Journal found no empirical studies of the eﬀect of the law. The same is true of several
important compilations of child protection research published in the years following the emergence
of the data sets discussed in Part II. These works rightly extolled the virtue of the empirical studies
that could be done with the new and improved data sets and predicted that the studies that would
emerge would prove essential to policy reform eﬀorts.94 Yet none of these works included any studies of the eﬀect of legal variations across the nation.
There are a few studies that focus on legal variables illustrating how valuable such research can
be. For instance, in the mid-1990s, Martin Guggenheim studied the changes which occurred in states
that experimented with expedited termination of parental rights, in a study that has been frequently
cited and coined the term “legal orphan,” which continues to impact child protection law and policy
discourse.95 Susan Mangold and others have studied the impact of diﬀerent funding regimes on permanency outcomes.96 Mary Eschelbach Hansen and I have studied the correlation of adoption subsidies oﬀered past age eighteen to overall adoption rates.97

VI. CONCLUSION: STUDY THE LAW AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
AND REFORM DATA SETS TO FACILITATE SUCH STUDY
The child welfare ﬁeld includes thousands of lawyers, judges, and professionals and advocates of
varying stripes who believe that the child welfare law matters to child welfare outcomes. It is
believed that whether permanency hearings are held within twelve or eighteen months, when counsel
is appointed for parties, what a state legislature deﬁnes as neglect, and a host of other legal variables
matters. Empirical evidence is, for good reason, increasingly used to shape child welfare practice and
it should be used to help evaluate legal diﬀerences among states. But it is not yet used that way
because the ﬁeld simply has not developed the empirical tool kit to study them. This Article is a call
for that to change.
Studying the eﬀect of the law would be easier if the major child welfare databases tracked key
legal variables. A comprehensive review of child welfare cases and outcomes cannot ignore the role
of the law and the legal system, yet current data tracking fails to measure essential details. The federal government should review and revise its regulations and policy guidance to facilitate greater
study of legal variables. To begin, NCANDS data should include a state speciﬁc reference to the
type of abuse or neglect alleged in a petition, what adjudication occurred, when hearings were held,
and what type they were. The federal government should provide ﬁnancial assistance to state child
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protection agencies to help them develop the requisite databases and accurate data-tracking
mechanisms.
But scholars should not wait for such reforms to focus on the study of the law’s impact; the value
of such study is so great that it should expand now. Innovative studies can develop data sets which
can be shared and which can provide important insights to current questions in child welfare law.
And some issues do not need reforms to data sets. The key legal variables can be found in comparing
state statutes and regulations, and valuable work can begin immediately.
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